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Abstract: 
This article focuses on the racialized consequences of neoliberal juvenile justice 
practices.  Based on over two years of ethnographic fieldwork inside of one state’s 
secure residential facilities and alternative to incarceration programs, the article 
scrutinizes contemporary intervention practices used with young people.  These 
practices emphasize the cultivation of individuality, rationality and ‘responsibility’ 
by young people.  I argue that to be successful in these programs, these forms of 
behavior invariably define ‘success’ as deference and submission to program staff 
and standards.  In other words, ‘responsibility’ is often a form of repression.  In a 
youth justice system where a vast majority of the young people in detention and 
residential placement are African-American, it is quite possible to trace the direct 
line between the early forms of social control directed at African-Americans in the 
United States and those that exist today. 
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The racist effects of incarceration have been well-documented, but less easily 
discernable are the continued racist intents that may be inscribed within criminal 
justice systems in contemporary life.  Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
increasingly marginalized claims made by those who argue that intentional racial 
discrimination exists in the criminal justice system.   The Supreme Court ruled in 
McClesky vs. Kemp that “conscious, discriminatory intent” to exercise racial 
discrimination must exist for sentencing practices to be considered in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment (Alexander, 2010).   Outside of the legal system, 
scholars and theorists struggle to assertively identify racist intents in the criminal 
justice system in an increasingly empiricist context where evidence is more 
frequently heard than theory. 
This article describes the ways that behavioral interventions used in juvenile 
justice systems are shaped by racist assumptions about reformability.  It examines 
contemporary behavioral change interventions that conceptualize the ideal 
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recipient of those interventions as submissive, deferential, and responsible.  Success 
in these programs, which can facilitate freedom from incarceration, involves 
submission to them.  I will argue that these behavior change interventions have 
been structured and informed by racialized forms of social control that have existed 
since slavery and which arguably have devastating consequences for the life chances 
of the thousands of black and brown young people who pass through juvenile 
facilities each year. 
Behavioral change programs exert forms of control that are both structured 
by racist assumptions and result in damaging forms of racial inequality.  It is argued 
here that these programs have a lineage that goes further back than the history of 
behavioral psychology that they are often linked to. I make a critical link between 
early discourses of change, reform, and freedom as they were connected to African-
Americans during the post-Emancipation era and those that are used in juvenile 
justice systems today.   
A brief historiography of Reconstruction-era interventions in the lives of 
putatively ‘free’ African-American adults and children reveal the pernicious ways 
that ideas about the expression of ‘freedom’ and will were in fact highly controlled 
and circumscribed (Hartman, 1997). Reconstruction-era forms of social control also 
arguably created the foundations for our contemporary systems of justice.  Black 
Codes, chain gangs, convict leasing, and the transmogrification of these institutions 
into the mass criminalization of African-Americans remain profoundly influential in 
our contemporary justice system (Muhammad, 2010, Blackmon, 2008).  Americans 
also have history of differentiating in a racialized manner between children who are 
considered to be deserving or undeserving of help that has persisted to the present 
day (Ward, 2012, Pickett and Chiricos, 2012, Feld, 1999).  While our juvenile 
facilities may be racially integrated, and services provided to young people charged 
with crimes may be at least putatively equal in their application, those young people 
who are punished by the state are overwhelmingly black and brown.   
In the juvenile justice system today, discussions about ‘race’ at the policy 
level are often focused on the disproportionate numbers of youth in the system.  
Advocates have sought to remedy this by creating what Geoff Ward has termed the 
“nonracial” juvenile justice system by reducing racial disproportionality, not 
necessarily the system itself (2012: 255).  What is often overlooked in these 
discussions is that the disproportionate confinement of youth of color means not 
only that they disproportionately encounter these approaches aimed at their 
submission, but also that the approaches are arguably specifically tailored for them.  
In addition to tracing the roots of these discourses of change, I will also point to the 
ways that juvenile justice interventions perpetuate racial inequality.  
  
Research Background 
   The analysis advanced in this article is based on a qualitative research study 
about juvenile facilities in New York.  For the two studies on which the research was 
based, I gained access to four juvenile facilities where I conducted observational 
fieldwork and interviews with young people and staff from 2008 to 2012.  In the 
first study, I examined the lives of 39 young people as they experienced the justice 
system, focusing on their responses to the forms of governance they faced in secure 
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care.  For the second study, I examined the role of staff in juvenile facilities, 
interviewing over 70 frontline and administrative staff.  In both studies, I spent 
extended periods of time observing daily life in the facilities, from meals, to 
recreational programs, to school, to treatment groups and team meetings.  
Throughout both research periods, I also engaged in participant observation at a 
number of state and local juvenile justice policy meetings.   
 The research responded to theories of ‘neoliberal’ penality (Muncie, 2006, 
Wacquant, 2009, Gray, 2005).  Scholars have argued that recent transformations in 
the American political economy have also re-configured our approaches to 
offending.  They claim that these new approaches seek to induce self-governance 
and responsibility for offending and crime control in part as a way of reducing the 
responsibilities of governments to provide for its citizens. These processes of so-
called ‘governmentality’ arguably seek to induce individuals to self-govern “actively 
and autonomously” (Crewe, 2009: 141). 
 It has been argued that contemporary prisons in advanced liberal 
democracies may be exhibiting ‘softer’ forms of power, which are aimed at inducing 
self-regulation (Crewe, 2009: 144).  Therapeutic interventions—and in particular, 
cognitive behavioral therapies—are increasingly introduced in prisons as a means 
of addressing the offender’s ostensible problems of self-control and regulation.  
Prisons have thus become the sites of what the criminologist Ben Crewe calls “neo-
paternalism,” or indirect efforts at control which seek to create a fully agentic, self-
governing citizen (2009: 137-148).   
  Few have examined the role that these forms of governmentality may play in 
juvenile facilities (although see Myers, 2013 for a recent example).  Juvenile facilities 
are fraught with tensions about care and control, and their existence raises 
considerable questions about how and why we induce ‘self-control’ and 
responsibility amongst young people who lack basic citizenship rights.  My research 
addressed two questions: How do theories of governmentality get experienced and 
expressed in practice in juvenile facilities?  What is the perspective of young people 
who are governed on being responsibilized?   
   
Racialized Governmentality 
 If the so-called responsibilizing practices present in juvenile reformatories 
both stimulate and suppress individual responsibility and development in juvenile 
facilities, it is arguable that we should be asking what the broader effects of these 
practices are on the group of individuals most likely to be incarcerated—black and 
brown youth. Much of the language and theorizing about governmentality is 
stripped of any allusions to racism.  Yet, if, as some commentators suggest, we now 
have forms of neoliberal penality, which are animated by a focus on responsibilizing 
offenders to participate in their own self-governance, should we not interrogate 
those practices more carefully for their potentially racist underpinnings?  For 
inasmuch as governmentality is a form of control, it is more specifically a form of 
racialized control.   
 Recent scholarship about the racialized effects of neoliberal penal practices 
have focused on the “expurgation” and warehousing of individuals—particularly 
people of color—who are considered to be useless in contemporary economic life, 
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or simply a threat to social order (Wacquant, 2009).  A number of scholars have 
pointed to the black “ghetto” resident, and in particular, the unemployed and young 
black person, as the socially constructed antithesis of the ideal neoliberal citizen 
(Roberts and Mahtani, 2010).  Yet, these analyses have largely focused again on the 
effects of neoliberal politics and policies; those who are deemed to be useless are 
said to be largely people of color.  As some have argued, however, this scholarship 
does not account for the ways that race may actually be an “organizing principle of 
society that neoliberalism reinforces and modifies” (Roberts and Mahtani, 2010: 
254).  Furthermore, it is critical to analyze the ways that even though racism might 
actually be constitutive of neoliberal practices, it is masked by them; the power of 
discourses of neoliberalism to promote the language of rationality, choice, and 
individuality is also to strip away at structural explanations for individual and social 
behaviors (Goldberg, 2009, Roberts and Mahtani, 2010).   
   This article largely focuses on the ways that racism becomes masked by 
treatment practices aimed at young people charged with crimes.  It moves beyond 
the focus of contemporary theorists on the overtly punitive practices of today’s 
warehouse prisons and instead focuses on the seemingly innocuous practices of 
treatment for behavioral change.      
  
Responsibilizing Practices 
 
The facilities I studied use behavioral change programs that exist in 
reformatories and residential facilities across the country.  The programs employ a 
‘stage’ system, in which residents ascend through a behavioral hierarchy by 
receiving incentives for compliance with the program of treatment in the facility.  
This has also been described as a ‘token’ economy, or points and levels system, 
which became en vogue in mental health and juvenile delinquency settings in the 
1960s (Kazdin, 1982).   
The behavioral change programming that exists in the facilities derives from 
theories of moral development.  It is assumed that youth who enter the facilities are 
morally underdeveloped, in that they’ve committed a crime. Through a system of 
corrections, they are eventually expected to engage in what are sometimes termed 
“pro-social” behaviors or more apparently more age-appropriate behaviors.  While 
there are some explicit group treatment offerings that focus on facilitating moral 
reasoning, this process of development is largely expected to occur by youth 
following various rules for behavior.  In New York, a young facility resident is 
provided these rules and expectations in the form of a resident behavior manual and 
via the oral directions (and corrections) of frontline staff members.   
It should be noted that in the last five years, New York, like many other states 
around the country, has sought to introduce new treatment modalities, specifically 
those focused on young people’s experiences of trauma, into their residential 
facilities.  System administrators have also changed rules, including those guiding 
the use of physical restraints (forcing staff to rely less on restraints), introducing 
some more extracurricular activities, and trying to improve conditions of 
confinement.   But what did not change over the course of these reforms was what 
everyone in the facilities referred to as ‘The Program.’  This gestalt term is symbolic 
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of the way that the expectation of behavioral change was the life force of the facility.  
For the staff and the youth, ‘doing the program’ was the foundation of daily life.  
 The philosophy that youth can be guided through stages of cognitive and 
moral development is rooted in problematic assumptions about the universality of 
childhood development.  These ideas –promulgated by theorists such as Jean Piaget 
and Lawrence Kohlberg—characterize childhood development as a path away from 
disorder and toward order (or, as Piaget characterizes it, “from chaos to cosmos” 
(Piaget, 1955)).  Yet a number of scholars have pointed out that there is no universal 
experience of childhood, and that the “hegemony of developmental stage 
monitoring” has resulted in the disproportionate punishment of “those who fail to 
meet that standard, whether in education, bodily development or welfare” (James et 
al., 1998: 19).  Additionally, there is an “assumed universality” in understanding the 
“practice and experience” of childhood (James et al., 1998: 25) that grows out of 
Enlightenment epistemologies and from white, and masculine, researcher 
orientations. This has arguably resulted in models resulting from this research being 
both androcentric and ethnocentric (Haines and Case, 2008, Holland et al., 2000).   
A child’s ability to progress according to hegemonic notions of development 
is arguably connected to their community’s economic ‘development’ (Katz, 2004) 
and their relationship to institutions of education, medicine, and welfare, which 
either praise or condemn their cognitive and emotional growth.  Under the 
developmental stage models, unrestrained and unsocialized youth are arguably 
brought under ‘control’ through normalizing and institutionalizing processes.  It is 
inevitable that those youth who are seen to depart from normal stages of 
development are those whose relationships to development are structured by their 
race, ethnicity, class and gender. 
 The behavioral change programs used in juvenile facilities also link notions 
of development to a young person’s riskiness.  Juvenile facilities around the country 
use what is called a ‘Risk-need-responsivity’ model which connects interventions to 
the ‘risks’ and needs of offenders, and “match[es] strategies to the learning styles 
and motivation of cases” (Andrews et al., 2006: 7).  These ‘risks’ and ‘needs’ are 
generally identified at a young person’s entrance into the system through actuarial 
tools. Those critical of these tools have shown that the risks that youth present are 
structured by race, class, and gender constructs (Moore and Padavic, 2011, 
Harcourt, 2010).  Kelly argues that risk factors simply recode “institutionally 
structured relations of class, gender, ethnicity, (dis)ability and geography as 
complex, but quantifiable, factors which place youth at-risk” (2000: 469).  Yet while 
these interventions are said to be responsive to risk, they are also actively seeking 
to neutralize youth risk—they seek out ways of limiting young people’s outward 
manifestations of ‘riskiness.’   
Thus, while juvenile facility authorities cannot change a young person’s class, 
their race, or their gender, these interventions focus on changing a young person’s 
behavior.  Evaluations of ‘good’ or respectable behaviour are often deeply tied to 
one’s class and race (Skeggs, 1997).  As “structurally organized social positions 
enable and limit our access to cultural, economic, social and symbolic capital” 
(Skeggs, 1997), and these forms of capital shape not only the ways that an 
individual’s identity is perceived to be coherent (and arguably, developed), but also 
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their behaviors that are seen to be normative, then it is inevitable that those who 
have been barred access to these forms of capital are at a disadvantage.  In the case 
of our juvenile justice systems, it is most often children of color whose social 
positions have barred them from acquiring these forms of capital. 
 
Racialized Reformability 
 
 Notions of reformability have played a key role throughout the history of the 
juvenile justice system.  Those youth who are perceived to be most reformable but 
also assimilable throughout the history of the system have been provided with 
interventions aimed at their integration and assimilation.  In the late 19th century, 
white youth who transgressed standards of morality were placed in early juvenile 
reformatories, while black youth, considered unredeemable, were placed in prisons 
(Ward, 2012, Tanenhaus, 2004).  As juvenile reformatories began to accept black, 
Mexican, and Native American youth over the early part of the 20th century, these 
institutions sought ways to maintain the racial hierarchies that continued to 
predominate in social worlds outside of these institutions.  One solution, identified 
by leaders at the Whittier reformatory in California, was to introduce intelligence 
testing; those youth deemed to be ‘feebleminded,’ who were mainly made up of 
recent Mexican migrant youth who were made to take intelligence tests in English, 
were identified for segregation and sterilization in colonies for the feeble-minded in 
the service of social engineering and eugenics (Chavez-Garcia, 2007).  Those white 
youth who remained in juvenile reformatories were provided with interventions 
aimed at building character and self-discipline.   
 Juvenile institutions continued to be racially segregated well into the 20th 
century, even after de facto segregation ended; in New York, the collision of race and 
religion effectively resulted in Jewish, Irish, and Italian youth housed in 
reformatories run by religious and charitable organizations well into the 1970s 
(Bernstein, 2001).    The lack of charitable institutions available for black youth who 
were considered to be neglected and abused, as well as an adequate foster care 
infrastructure, often resulted in those youth being pronounced delinquent simply for 
the purposes of identifying a placement for them, as noted by Justine Wise Polier, a 
former New York City Family Court judge: 
 
When there was no voluntary agency willing to accept a neglected child and no home to 
which the child could be returned, a flimsy delinquency petition might be concocted in order 
to get a bed for a black child in the State Training School for delinquents (1989: 141). 
 
Thus, as delinquency and neglect collided for young African-American youth in New 
York, so too did ideas about class, poverty, neglect, race, and ‘risk.’  Those youth in 
need of assistance were summarily transformed into those at risk for delinquency; 
as we know from the research about the criminogenic effects of confinement, it is 
quite possible that these young people’s very experiences in confinement actually 
made them more ‘risky.’   
  Black youth began to be sent to reformatories previously only reserved for 
whites as the 20th century began, and yet their experiences there remained marked 
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by racism.  Black youth were provided interventions aimed at securing their futures 
as menial laborers, and they often remained in reformatories longer than their 
white counterparts (Ward, 2012).  Thus, in early juvenile justice systems, 
expectations that Black children would not move beyond their class position shaped 
the harsher and longer punishments and interventions they received.   
 While the foundations of the juvenile justice system may have been explicitly 
linked to racialized desires for social control, as juvenile justice systems throughout 
the 20th century and early part of this century were desegregated, racist eugenics 
practices eliminated, and explicitly race-based distinctions removed, what remains 
are simply what some see as the racist effects of these policies.  In the sections 
below, I will focus on some aspects of contemporary behavioral interventions that 
reveal the persistence of racialized forms of social control.  These themes all relate 
to the construction of young people’s responsibility, their choices, and their capacity 
for agency and self-change.   I will then go on to trace some of the ways that these 
themes express racialized governmentality. 
 
Physical Punishment 
 
 In his analysis of the early forms of punishment that emerged in the post-
Civil War South, David Oshinsky points to the contiguity between the forms of 
corporal punishment that occurred under slavery and those which occurred in the 
convict leasing system and in prisons.  He found that on the convict leasing farms, 
”whipping was the punishment of choice.  Though it had long been used against both 
races in the South, the belief persisted that discipline for blacks required a strong 
dose of physical force” (1996: 61).  As a number of scholars have pointed out, early 
racist beliefs which promulgated theories about the ‘bestial’ nature of African-
Americans, and which were used to justify slavery, found new force in the 
Reconstruction South, but also in the scholarship of some early sociologists, who 
used scientific racism to “write crime into race,” as Muhammad (2010) argues. 
 Corporal punishment was part of the American juvenile justice system from 
its inception (Fox, 1970).  However, physical restraints, which are used by staff in 
facilities to prevent young people from harming themselves or others, did not come 
into use in settings for children with “emotional disturbance” until the 1950s (Ryan 
and Peterson, 2004).   Today, physical restraints are used in juvenile facilities across 
the country, ostensibly as a form of protection for youth.  Yet, as the United States 
Department of Justice have found in their investigations of juvenile facilities across 
the United States, staff members often used physical restraints as a form of 
punishment (see, e.g. King, 2009).  In response to these findings, a number of state-
based juvenile facilities have actively sought to force staff to reduce their reliance on 
physical restraints. 
 In New York, a number of staff interviewed for this research study spoke 
about their sense that they had “lost control” over the young people when their 
ability to use physical restraints was restricted as a result of systemic reforms.  Staff 
sometimes used animal metaphors to describe the ways in which young people 
should be addressed by the system, and connected these characterizations to their 
lamentations about the decline of physical restraints.  A facility-based teacher, when 
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speaking about his frustrations about a new disciplinary model in the system, said 
“if a dog comes and pees on the floor, you don’t talk nicely to him.”  Another staff 
member discussed how he had employed the same techniques of sanction and 
reward which a young person that he had used with his dog, referencing his dog’s 
electric collar.  These ideas are rooted in the assumption that physical punishment 
and control were an effective means (or perhaps the only means) of establishing 
social control over the young people.  It is hard not to also make the connection 
between early racialized conceptions about which groups of individuals ‘need’ 
physical force in order to exercise conformity with institutional and social norms.   
 
‘Structure’ vs. ‘Street’ 
 
 A number of juvenile facility staff felt that their facility, its programming, and 
its routines offered an antidote to what they perceived of as the undisciplined 
existence that the young people lived on ‘the street’ and with their families.  For the 
staff, the facilities offered these youth what they described as “structure.”  These 
perceptions were often racially coded; at the time of the research 62 percent of the 
young people in the rural facilities studied came from New York City, and 88 percent 
of those admitted to the facilities were youth of color (Office of Children and Family 
Services, 2009).  Thus, for many staff (regardless of whether those staff were white, 
Latino/a, or African-American), “city kids” was a metonym for kids of color.  
 Urban life, and thus by extension, the lives of youth of color, was perceived 
by a number of staff to be criminogenic.  Some of the staff described what they 
perceived as an almost feral existence the young people had lived ‘on the streets’ 
and ‘in the city’ before they had arrived in the facility and received structure and 
‘discipline’ in their daily lives in the facility.  A number of staff members expressed 
the sense that the programs and practices—and in particular, the ‘discipline’ and 
‘structure’ of the facility—were necessary for these young people.  Yet while staff 
made vague allusions to the discipline and structure of facility life preventing young 
people from offending, at least temporarily, few of them offered concrete ideas 
about how the particular interventions would change young people’s lives for good.  
In fact, a number of staff lamented young people’s departure from facility 
environments “back to the streets,” as they said that the young people would simply 
revert to their previously unstructured lives, and thus resort to crime again.  In this 
sense, the facilities were presented as a kind of temporary, incapacitative site rather 
than a full transformative tool.  As one staff member put it, “we can change the kids, 
but we can’t change the outside.”  The ideas of urbanity and criminality have been 
powerful tools in bolstering rurally-based punitive strategies. 
 
Self-Discipline and a Disciplined Self 
 
 In New York, as in many other states, a young person’s progress in treatment 
in juvenile facilities is assessed and documented by staff who exercise the discretion 
to determine whether or not they are meeting the organization’s expectations.  In 
the facilities studied, residents are assessed through a progress report that focuses 
on two categories of behavior: self-discipline and interpersonal relations.  Progress 
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reports differ by the ‘stage’ that a resident is on; in the first (‘orientation’) stage, for 
example, there are five criteria for self-discipline: 
 
• Obey laws and comply with facility rules with staff direction. 
• Describe non-violent alternatives for resolving conflicts and use them with 
staff direction. 
• Describe acceptable methods for controlling impulsive behavior and use 
them with staff direction. 
• Acknowledge rule violations, but minimizes its [sic] importance. 
• Describe the problem solving steps and use them with staff direction. 
 
As indicated above, a young person in the ‘orientation’ stage of treatment is 
expected to exhibit a kind of controlled self-discipline; their efforts at self-discipline 
must be responsive to staff direction.  Thus, this is a paradoxical form of self-
discipline in that it is a disciplined self-discipline. 
 The young people who were disciplined by these practices often found 
themselves trapped by their pernicious consequences.  One young man, Derron,1 
was found to “need improvement” in controlling his impulsive behavior while he 
was in the facility.   Derron was in a facility several hours away from his home in the 
city.  He was placed there after he violated the conditions of a community-based 
program to which he had been originally sentenced.  While participating in the 
community-based program, Derron did not meet a court-imposed curfew, nor did he 
attend school; his probation was revoked, and he was sent to confinement.  While he 
was out in the community, he had been told by probation that he needed to find 
“acceptable methods for controlling impulsive behavior.”  Throughout his time in 
the facility, Derron was identified as someone who was non-compliant with the 
facility’s behavior expectations and was again told by staff that he needed to control 
his impulses.  He remained frustrated, withdrawn, and defiant in response to these 
commands. 
 Derron perceived the staff in his facility to be racist, a quality they shared 
with the police officers back home in Derron’s community. He felt that police and 
staff perceived “black” to mean “bad” and that it was inevitable that he would be 
punished and policed more harshly than his white counterparts.  His perception was 
that these forms of racism were linked to the policing of his behavior, as shown in 
his response to the following question about staff: 
 
A:  Can you give me some examples of how they’re racist? 
 D.  They’ll write me up quicker than they write up somebody else.  Somebody who’s racist 
 will write me up, pretty quick. 
 
Derron was resigned about his feelings of systemic injustice, and his way of fighting 
back against it were simply to resist the rules of the facility he was in, because he 
felt he had no power.  He felt “bored” by the facility programming, which made him 
“angry” that he wasn’t able to be productive while he was inside—his sense was that 
                                                      
1 Pseudonyms are used throughout this article. 
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he was wasting time there.  Yet his ability to develop a sense of self through this 
anger was arguably prevented by the sanctions that he experienced as a “non-
compliant” resident; his life in the facility was ultimately harder than those who 
complied with the rules, and beset by his constant interface with staff who found 
him to be non-compliant.  
 For staff who worked in the system, Derron was a classic example of a 
“neutralizer,” someone who was overly focused on his experience of being 
victimized by staff in a way that precluded his ability to take responsibility for his 
behavior (Maruna and Copes, 2005).  Staff felt that Derron’s resistance to the 
program, and his inability to change and ultimately stop offending, was rooted in his 
preoccupation with the racism of the facility staff.  Yet Derron understood the 
ironies of responsibility and self-discipline in the facility; he saw that adults felt that 
“acceptable behavior” was simply deferential behavior.   
 
Responsibility taking/Personal responsibility 
 
 Derron framed responsibility and blame in a manner which was deemed 
unacceptable according to the logics of the facility program.  In the program, young 
people were expected to take “personal responsibility” for the crimes that they were 
involved in and any behavior they engaged in which went against facility rules.  Any 
young people who engaged in what was deemed to be excuse-making were seen by 
staff as underdeveloped—unable to be mature enough to individualize their 
problems.   
 The facility programming—rooted in social learning theories that connect 
neutralizations to criminogenic behaviors—promoted the idea that the young 
people had been socialized to rationalize not only their offending behavior but even 
their everyday resistances to the norms of the institutions they interfaced with—
schools, welfare centers, and so on.  Thus, in the facility, any behavior in the 
classrooms which did not conform to traditional classroom expectations—sitting 
upright in one’s chair, raising one’s hand, asking to leave the room—was seen to be 
consistent with the idea that these were young people who just simply did not know 
how to conform.  Thus, even low-level incivilities—such as failing to tuck in a shirt, 
stepping out of line when walking between activities, or falling asleep in class—
were penalized with “levels” or demerits.   Some institutional staff felt that policing 
these behaviors reinforced ideas about normative, acceptable and “responsible” 
behavior, which could be generalized to the outside world.   
 Young people’s “irresponsible” thinking was also policed.  There were several 
kinds of thinking that were deemed to be irresponsible within institutional life.  One 
was the language of racism; as one staff member said, in describing the ways that 
young people identify racism as the source of their struggles, these young people 
“feed off the victim mentality that’s been taught to them.”  Another form of thinking 
considered to be irresponsible within the program discourse and that was actively 
suppressed was any kind of suggestion, on the part of young people, that the crimes 
that they engaged in were in any way reflective of the structural violence that they 
may have faced in their lives.   Instead, they were encouraged to speak the language 
of personal responsibility. 
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Fetishizing the will  
 
 The behavioral change program used in the juvenile facilities encouraged 
youth to cultivate a highly controlled form of agency.  As a resident ascended the 
behavioral change system, they were expected to demonstrate their capacities for 
initiative and independent action, yet these capacities were ultimately highly 
controlled in that notions of acceptable independent action were delineated by staff 
members. Thus, Derron, who was on the ‘orientation’ stage of the behavioral change 
program, where young people were expected to follow staff directions at all times, 
was ultimately not in a very different position of power than his counterpart 
Panama, who was on the highest behavioral stage, the ‘Honors’ stage, but who 
ultimately had to engage in high levels of behavior management in order to maintain 
his position at that stage.  In other words, Derron was highly policed; Panama 
engaged in a high level of self-policing.   
 Panama and his cohort of ‘honors’ residents would often speak about the 
forms of strategic individualism they would engage in so they could find their ways 
through the program more successfully.  The young people in this group would 
often use the language of the staff—and an oft-repeated phrase—“youcome here 
alone, you leave here alone”—to describe what they felt was their strongly agentic 
passage through treatment.  A number of the young men in particular would use a 
conversion narrative to describe their ability to embrace the individualized passage 
through treatment (one young man even described being in the “wilderness” before 
he decided to ‘change’ and embrace ‘the program’); Jamy, for example, said that once 
he started improving his “behavior,” he was able to improve himself.   One young 
man, Peter, was like a few of his peers who asked for “stronger discipline and 
stronger consequences” from staff so that they could learn how to enforce this sense 
of self-discipline.  In some respects, this is reflective of Scott’s (1990) notion of 
compliance with rules and norms as a means of obtaining material benefits and as a 
form of resistance. 
 While these statements at first seemed to mimic staff language about willful 
change, it is arguable that their words were less performative than they initially 
seemed—they were ultimately strategic and responsive to the demands of the 
system. The young men who engaged in self-disciplined behavior would 
acknowledge that those who did not, like Derron, might mock them or say that they 
had sold out to the system.  A well-respected Honors resident, Steve, said that a 
younger resident had come up him and said, “the system got ya’ll,” and that “you’ve 
changed.”  Panama said that he told these younger residents that “I’m trying to go 
home,” and that “I don’t care” what they think.   
 A number of these young people, and the staff that they worked with, held 
out the exercise of the will as the marker of individual change and the facilitator of 
desistance from crime.  The ‘will’ became fetishized in this process; young people 
were taught that their success in the program was solely dependent upon their 
willful self-change (Silva, 2013).  The irony of this idea about the will was that a 
number of the young people—boys and girls—performed this notion of change in 
order to simply lift some of the pains of imprisonment (Cox, 2011). 
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Barriers to the exercise of agency 
 
 In her book on working-class young adults trying to exercise self-change in 
the context of neoliberalism, Jennifer Silva (2013) points to the onset and the ironies 
of notions of willful self-change.  The idea that people are responsible for their 
emotional fates grows out of some of the neoliberal discourses of personal 
responsibility.  Silva finds that working class young adults, who are in a sense most 
likely to be negatively affected by the rise in social inequality, unemployment, and 
social dislocation, are just as apt to embrace narratives of willful self-change as 
those wealthier individuals who ostensibly have greater access to the resources of 
the mood economy—including self-help narratives, therapy, and so on. 
 Silva’s work has important parallels to the lives of the young people in 
juvenile justice settings.  The inducements towards willful self-change in the 
facilities are made to a group of young people who face extraordinary barriers to 
self-efficacy, self-actualization, and ultimately, economic and social survival beyond 
bars.  The structural barriers to reentry from juvenile facilities and prisons are 
immense: young people face difficulties in reentering their schools (and applying to 
college), finding employment, obtaining public benefits, finding a home (and 
sometimes, as a result of their arrest, being banned from their homes), and 
recovering from punishing debts and court fees (Apel and Sweeten, 2010, Harris et 
al., 2010, Sullivan, 2004).  Perhaps most significantly for the purposes of this article, 
the young people in this research were returning home to a climate in which they 
would face disproportionate police scrutiny simply as a result of the color of their 
skin; many returned to New York City, where during the time of their return, the 
rates of people of color stopped under the New York City Police Department’s Stop 
and Frisk policies were extraordinarily high (New York Civil Liberties Union, 2013, 
Jones-Brown et al., 2010).  In short, these individuals, especially as ones known to 
the police, found themselves in police contact on a near daily basis, often simply for 
walking down the street.  
  The existential barriers these young people face are also powerful: they 
struggle to cope with the stigma of their association with the criminal justice 
system, the time that they spent away from their friends and family during their 
teenage years, and the ambivalence they may feel about experiencing some level of 
respect they receive from their peers for having been involved with the system.  In 
short, they found that the very strategies that they had been encouraged to cultivate 
while inside of the facilities actually may have prevented them from coping with the 
barriers they faced on the outside, and may have even yoked them further to the 
systems of dependency that they were taught to stay away from. 
 
Responsible submission? 
 In her work on the insidious effects of slavery and Reconstruction practices 
aimed at cultivating freedom, Saidiya Hartman poses an important question:  “What 
if the presumed endowments of man—conscience, sentiment, and reason—rather 
than assuring liberty or negating slavery acted to yoke slavery and freedom?” (1997: 
5).  She explores the effects of Reconstruction-era practices ostensibly aimed at 
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promoting the exercise of rational thought and will amongst recently freed slaves 
but which instead promoted servility.  Her question is instructive for these 
purposes:  what if the behaviors that are promoted within juvenile facilities – 
personal responsibility and self-discipline – rather than assuring that a young 
person will be released from custody and ultimately from offending and criminal 
justice system involvement – actually acted to, paradoxically, link self-discipline and 
punishment?   
 A number of scholars have pointed to the persistent conflation of blackness 
and criminality in our cultural imagination.  Hartman takes this one step further—
she argues that “the persistent production of blackness as abject, threatening, 
servile, dangerous, dependent, irrational, and infectious” (1997: 116) contributed to 
the particular strategies that were used to carve out the continued domination of 
black Americans after slavery.  It is arguable that the behavioral interventions used 
in juvenile facilities mirror and extend those used immediately after slavery; 
through long terms of incapacitation they neutralize the infectious threat (see also 
Young, 1999); by encouraging deference they seek to perpetuate notions of servility, 
at least in its newest form, through participation in the service economy; by 
requiring expressions of personal responsibility they seek to eliminate dependence; 
and by preventing young people from expressing their experiences of racist 
victimization, the pains of poverty, or any structural explanations of offending, they 
promote a rational choice model of offending (Garland, 2001).  In short, these 
interventions are actually responsive to persistent ideas about blackness in 
contemporary culture. 
 Finally, the interventions used in juvenile facilities raise paradoxical and 
complex questions about the exercise of free will and agency.  Derron’s expression 
of ‘free will’ is not acceptable; Panama’s is.  Questioning, resisting, and critiquing 
facility practices are unacceptable.  Providing an explanation for one’s offending that 
identifies the complex causes of crime—beyond rational choice—is unacceptable.  
But responding to orders, engaging in ostensibly self-disciplined behavior, and 
taking full responsibility for one’s actions is acceptable.  As Hartman observed of 
notions of freedom and responsibility at the brink of Emancipation: 
 
The free(d) individual was nothing if not burdened, responsible, and obligated.  
Responsibility entailed accounting for one’s actions, dutiful suppliance, contractual 
obligation, and calculated reciprocity.  Fundamentally, to be responsible was to be 
blameworthy.  In this respect, the exercise of free will, quite literally, was inextricable from 
guilty infractions, criminal misdeeds, punishable transgressions, and an elaborate 
micropenality of everyday life (1997: 125). 
 
Hartman describes the burdens of Emancipation—of demonstrating one’s 
worthiness of freedom but also being systematically denied access to that freedom.  
As slave owners were forced to abandon the whip, they had to find ways to motivate 
the labor of the formerly enslaved; she found that they did that through the 
cultivation of conduct which was considered to be “rational, servile, and self-
interested” (1997: 127).  Ultimately, they found ways to police those individuals 
who did not engage in such behavior. 
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 The parallels between notions of constrained agency promoted in the post-
Civil War years and today are unmistakable; each are concerned with the exercise 
social control in which individuals appear to be acting consensually.  While some 
may dispute the clearly racialized process of social control that exists in juvenile 
facilities today, it is arguable that we can trace a clear path of the racialized 
governance of youth of color.  
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